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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE VALUE OF AN INITIAL LOOK AT COUNTERINTUITIVE
EVIDENCE RULES

JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL* & W. DANIEL SHIEH**
Just prior to taking a course in Evidence, a typical law student will have
some idea of the rules involved, but will not have seriously considered the
policies, or lack thereof, to support those rules or the decisions applying them.
Because individuals, in or out of law school, are throughout life constantly
called upon to make decisions, they develop some sense about the nature and
type of information that they wish to have before making a determination. The
instinctive notions about what type of evidence is or is not important and
reliable does not always comport with the formal evidence rulings employed
for courtroom purposes. Indeed some rulings seem counterintuitive in a
modern world while others are highly questionable. It sets a proper tone for
the course if, at the outset, students are prepared to question the validity of
various rules and their interpretation.
In Evidence courses, the tendency is to plow through the formal Federal
Rules of Evidence, beginning with relevancy, moving to issues of reliability,
and ending with matters governed by special policies, such as privilege.
Although the underlining policies and rationales are explored along the way,
emphasis tends to be on the way the rules read and how they are interpreted,
which is, of course, of major significance. It may be worthwhile, however, to
spend a session or two at the very start of the course exploring policy and
rationale regarding some of those areas where the rules seem to diverge from
what the students beginning a course in evidence would believe the rules
should be. Simply noting what those areas are, and what information they
involve, can heighten student interest in the course and provide some lively
debates that can continue throughout the course.
One possibility is to ask the students, at the very outset of the course, to
answer a questionnaire containing a number of fairly simple inquiries that raise
the issues and make students aware that all they might surmise is not
necessarily what the result will be in a court of law. There are numerous
possible examples. Some rules will seem to make little sense even after
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consideration of the policies that are said to justify them. Others may appear
counterintuitive at first but ultimately will make sense to the student after some
reflection. It would appear useful to include examples of both in the
questionnaire to make students aware that what may seem intuitive can often
cut both ways. We have prepared a short set of questions, attached hereto1 as
one approach, but there are many inquiries in other areas that could be
substituted.
Consider, for example, a situation in which a person involved in an
automobile accident divulges facts showing her negligence in separate
confidential statements to her husband and her twin sister. Should either of
these individuals be forced to testify as to what they were told? Suppose the
statements were made to one’s child or to an unmarried life-partner? If
privileges are to exist to preserve important relationships, what rationale could
justify different results regarding the different people involved? Or consider
the varying rules among the states regarding the situation when one spouse is
called upon to testify against the other in a criminal case.2 Should the spouse
who is called be permitted to refuse to testify? If the spouse is willing to
testify should the defendant spouse be permitted to prevent the testimony? Is
there any reason to believe that prohibiting a person from willingly giving
adverse testimony against one’s spouse would help preserve the relationship?
The instructor need not answer all of the questions that might arise at such an
early stage of the course; it would be sufficient to note the differences and
challenge the student to think about why, or why not, it should exist so as to be
prepared to respond when matters of privilege are reached in due course.
Of course the hearsay rules, and in particular some of the exceptions, are
prime targets for similar analysis. In a modern society does the dying
declaration make any sense?3 Do past assumptions of a person’s belief in the
afterlife still hold true today? If they do not, should dying declarations that are
clearly self-interested be admissible? Even if the assumption holds true and
guarantees that the dying person is not likely to deliberately lie, does it equally
guarantee his or her perception of who is responsible?
Another prime area for raising awareness is that which involves admission
against an employer of statements of an employee regarding the subject of the
employment. Assume, for example, that a company vehicle is involved in an
accident in which the driver of another vehicle is injured and brings suit
against the company. The driver of the company vehicle informed his or her
1. See the “Questionnaire” immediately following this Article.
2. While the Supreme Court has held that the privilege can only be invoked by the witness
spouse in Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980), a number of states continue to allow
either spouse to invoke the privilege. See, e.g., ALASKA R. EVID. (505)(a)(1) (1989), available at
http://www.state.ak.us/courts/ev.htm#505; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(1)(a) (West 2000);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-802 (2003).
3. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
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supervisor, the head of the company motor pool: “The accident was all my
fault.” The driver has left the company’s employ and can no longer be located.
Why should the supervisor, who has no personal knowledge of the facts, be
required to repeat the absent driver’s admission?4 If the driver had said, “It
was all the other driver’s fault,” why should that statement be excluded?
A similar situation can occur with regard to the admission of statements of
a party to a lawsuit that were favorable to the party when made but turn out to
be unfavorable in the legal action.5 Consider a situation in which a person lies
about the ferocity of his watchdog in order to obtain lower premiums on his
homeowner’s insurance. If the dog later attacks a pedestrian, why do the rules
permit the statement to be admitted? If the purpose of the rules of evidence
were to serve a policy goal of punishing persons for lying, perhaps admitting
the statement should be permissible. But if the goal is to ensure an accurate
trial, then perhaps the admissibility of the statement should be reconsidered.
Other interesting examples in which a common sense approach seems to
prevail in the face of “technical policy” difficulties are in areas in which the
basic underlying policy seems primarily to be the fact that we intuitively
believe that the information is credible. Thus a statement of one’s intent to act
in the future is admissible to show that the person did indeed carry out the
stated intent.6 In fact, there is no more reason to credit such a statement than
one in which a person outside of the trial describes an act that he has just
completed, although the latter would be considered inadmissible hearsay
unless it falls within another exception. If anything, the former type of
evidence is more vulnerable than the latter since not only may a person falsely
state what his or her intent is, but also the person may decide not to carry out
an honestly stated intention.
One area in which the rules have seemingly gone astray, due primarily to
political furor that energized Congress, involves the use against a criminal
defendant of certain prior crimes. Although a defendant’s past convictions are
generally inadmissible to establish his or her guilt,7 specific rules have been
added in cases of sexual assault or child molestation permitting admission of
prior convictions of those same types of crimes.8 One cannot help but note a
very real concern that an innocent defendant will be convicted solely on the
basis of past crimes. Yet the rules remain in force despite the fact that
empirical studies have not turned up conclusive evidence of a higher
recidivism rate to distinguish sexual crimes from those of murder or theft.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A).
FED. R. EVID. 803(3).
See, e.g., FED R. EVID. 404(b); FED. R. EVID. 406.
FED. R. EVID. 413–15.
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It is true that a course in Evidence will normally address many of these
issues as the course progresses. But some of the benefits of early exposure to
these issues may be lost as students scurry to learn the black letter of the law
rather than seeking to understand its intended purpose. By presenting these
and other similar issues at the outset of the course, it can help lay a proper
foundation for students to examine the assumptions underlying the rules and
thereby enable them to provide a more meaningful analysis of complex
evidentiary matters, first as students and ultimately as practitioners, who can
take leading roles in the necessary reformation of evidentiary rules.
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QUESTIONNAIRE
You are the presiding judge over the following proceedings and must
decide what evidence should be admitted in each case.
Mary and Bill are married with two small children. Both Mary and Bill
were avowed atheists, a fact known to their local community that includes
many very religious families.
John and Joe are twin brothers in the community. Joe is an upstanding
person who was friendly with Mary and Bill. John, however, is a troubled
young man who has had a number of violent encounters for which he has
served some time in prison. At the same time he has expressed deep religious
beliefs and animosity toward atheists.
Recently Bill and Mary were attacked by some local thugs. Bill was badly
beaten and Mary was sexually assaulted. Neither can conclusively identify
their assailants, who wore crimson ski masks, but the assailants did express
their displeasure due to their victim’s non-religious beliefs.
1. Several local young men have been arrested and charged with the crimes,
including John. John denies any involvement. At John’s trial for criminal
assault and rape, would you admit the following:
a. The actual showing of a gruesome scar on Bill’s abdomen, in addition
to testimony describing it, resulting from a knife wound received
during the assault, and reading “God Lives.”
 Yes
 No
b. John’s prior felony conviction for assault on a local tailor because “he
wouldn’t go to church on Sundays.”
 Yes
 No
c. John’s prior felony conviction for assault on a security guard where he
used a knife to write “God” on the guard’s lower back.
 Yes
 No
d. John’s prior conviction for attempted rape of a former girlfriend who
had broken off their relationship.
 Yes
 No
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e. A religious tract, written by John, entitled “Non-Believers Must Die”
that did not directly advocate violence.
 Yes
 No
f. Testimony by a trash collector that he saw a mask in the dumpster
behind John’s apartment in the early morning on the day after the
assault, although he could not recall its color.
 Yes
 No
g. John’s confidential statement to his lawyer, Lucy, regarding the crimes
against Mary and Bill, “Sure I took part. It served those guys right.”
 Yes
 No
h. John’s statement to his lawyer, Lucy, made when Lucy’s paralegal,
Peter, was present in Lucy’s office.
 Yes
 No
i. John’s statement to his lawyer, Lucy, made when Lucy’s golfing buddy
was present in Lucy’s office.
 Yes
 No
j. John’s confidential statement to his twin brother Joe regarding the
crimes against Mary and Bill, “I got those creeps and I’m glad.”
 Yes
 No
2. Suppose Wilma, John’s estranged wife, was in John’s apartment just prior
to the assaults on Mary and Bill, and it is believed that she has information
about John’s planning of the assaults at that time.
a. Can Wilma refuse to testify?
 Yes
 No
b. If Wilma is willing to testify, should John be able to successfully
prevent her from doing so?
 Yes
 No
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3. Suppose Bill dies from his injuries just prior to John’s trial. On his
deathbed, and fully aware that he is about to die, Bill whispers to the
attending nurse, “That troublemaker Joe is responsible for my death.” The
nurse immediately responds, “Don’t you mean John?” Bill passes away
before he can reply.
a. Should John be permitted to introduce Bill’s statement?
 Yes
 No
b. If the nurse testifies as to Bill’s deathbed statement, should the
prosecution be able to admit evidence to show that Bill was an avowed
atheist?
 Yes
 No
c. If the nurse testifies for John, should the prosecutor be able to show that
nine years previously, the nurse had been convicted of felony burglary,
for which she received one month in jail and three years probation, for
driving a getaway car for her then boyfriend?
 Yes
 No
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